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Summary 
We assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-
based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), 
and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition 
combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on 
production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the 
EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS – cement, steel and electricity – 
plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity 
price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU 
emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies 
greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least 
efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On 
the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among 
stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient 
policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world 
welfare perspective and whatever the emission reduction, AU-BA is the least costly 
policy, while OB-AU, AU and GF entail similar costs. 
 
Keywords: Emission Trading, Allowance Allocation, Leakage, Spillover, Climate 
Policy, Kyoto Protocol, Border Adjustment 
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1. Introduction 
The EU ETS, created by directive 2003/87/EC and presented in a box below, officially started 
operating in January 2005. It is one of the main EU climate policies and the most important 
ETS worldwide by the value of allowances (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). Moreover it is often 
seen as the possible core of a future international architecture (Stern, 2006) hence its 
performance is under world scrutiny. The ETS is currently being reviewed by the European 
Commission (2006), who should issue a legislative proposal on January 23
rd, 2008. The 
changes will take effect in 2013 at the start of the scheme’s third trading period. In this 
context, the main criticisms addressed to the system are the following
3. 
⇒  Some features of the allocation methods (updating of allocation every five years based on 
new information, new entrants reserve and withdrawal of allowances for closing installations) 
create perverse incentives in production and abatement decisions and jeopardize the economic 
efficiency of the system (Neuhoff et al., 2005; 2006; Åhman et al., 2007; Schleich and Betz, 
2005).  
⇒  The distributive impact of the ETS is often criticised as unfair. In particular, large 
electricity consumers claim that utilities benefit from windfall profits, passing the value of 
CO2 emissions on to prices although they receive allowances for free (Sijm et al., 2006). 
⇒  The EU CO2-intensive industry may suffer from a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
competitors located in countries without a similar climate policy. This may induce a loss in 
market shares and employment. It may also entail CO2 leakage, i.e., a part of the emission 
reductions generated in the EU may be offset by an increase in emissions elsewhere.  
Several proposals on the table aim at solving all or some of these problems. Most of them 
focus on the allocation methodology, which has already been recognised as the Achilles' heel 
of the directive (Boemare and Quirion, 2002). Indeed allocation is not only a distributive issue 
but may impact the economic efficiency and the competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. The five proposals we assess in this paper are the following. 
Output-based allocation (OB). Under this allocation method – also called intensity caps – 
the amount of free allowances a firm gets is proportional to its current output level. It is 
promoted by many industrials (EPE, 2005; Eurofer, 2005; Cembureau, 2006) in the context 
either of the EU ETS or of international sectoral approaches. Demailly and Quirion (2006) 
have shown, with a sectoral model of the cement industry, that OB induces no windfall profit 
and reduces the competitive disadvantage and CO2 leakage. However it may reduce economic 
efficiency compared to auctioning or grandfathering (Burtraw et al. 2001, Fischer 2001, 
Haites, 2003). Whether this remains true when leakage is accounted for is an open question 
we address in this paper. 
Grandfathering (GF). We already stressed that the current allocation method in the EU ETS 
leads to perverse economic incentives, which would not exist under auctioning or pure 
grandfathering, i.e., if all allowances were distributed freely without taking account of new 
information. Hence some authors propose to bring the current allocation method closer to 
grandfathering in order to improve its efficiency. This is the aim of Åhman et al (2006)'s "ten 
year rule" or Godard (2005)'s suggestion to suppress the new entrants reserves and the 
withdrawal of allowances for closing installations. However, such proposals could worsen the 
competitive disadvantage – updating, new entrants reserve and closure rules create an 
                                                 
3 In addition, many scholars and stakeholders criticise the lack of harmonisation in allowance allocation across 
Member States and claim for a harmonised or centralised allocation method at the European level (e.g. Buchner 
et al., 2006). Since there is a general agreement on this point, we will not address it. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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incentive against relocation in foreign countries – and increase further windfall profits, as 
shown by Demailly and Quirion (2008) with a sectoral model of the steel industry.  
Auctioning (AU). The competitive disadvantage would remain or could even be worsened if 
allowances were auctioned but windfall profits would disappear and this allocation method is 
generally considered as the most economically efficient, for two reasons. First and foremost, 
the revenue raised through the auction may be used to finance cuts in pre-existing distorting 
taxes (e.g. Goulder et al. 1999). Second, AU leads to the full internalisation of emission cost 
in electricity prices, even in price regulated markets, whereas it might not be the case under 
GF. Burtraw et al. (2001; 2002) highlight the importance of this effect for a US ETS covering 
the power sector. In this paper, we address neither the first effect, which would require a 
general equilibrium model, nor the second, which will critically depend on the evolution of 
the deregulation process in the power sector in the next decade. 
Auctioning with border-tax adjustments (AU-BTA). In such a system, exporters from the 
EU would get charges they incurred refunded, at least partially, while importers would face a 
tax based on the emissions embedded in their products
4. On the one hand, compared with AU, 
it would solve the competitive disadvantage issue, particularly leakage, as shown by Hoel 
(1996) with a theoretical model, by Demailly and Quirion (forthcoming) with a model of the 
cement sector and by Mathiesen and Mæstad (2002) with a model of the steel sector. On the 
other hand it would increase the impact on EU consumers. Hence its economic efficiency is 
unclear and we assess it in this paper. It is worth highlighting that the compatibility of BTA 
with WTO rules is controversial (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004; Biermann and Brohm, 2005) but 
they recently had the support of the Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2006), of the French 
current government or of the EU Industry commissioner Günter Verheugen (2006).  
Output-based allocation in cement and steel sectors and auctioning in the electricity 
sector (OB-AU). The rationale of this hybrid variant, which was considered in the 
Netherlands before the launch of the EU ETS (Kuik and Mulder, 2004), is that cement and 
steel, but not electricity, are exposed to international competition. 
In this paper, we assess both analytically and numerically the application of these five 
proposals to the EU ETS. We look at their impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage, overall 
economic cost and revenue distribution. To our knowledge, such a comprehensive assessment 
has not been led yet. Bernard et al. (2005) and Klepper and Peterson (2006) analyse with 
general equilibrium models the existing EU ETS but do not assess these proposals. Bernard et 
al. (2007), Burtraw et al. (2001), Fischer and Fox (2004), Haites (2003) or Kuik and Mulder 
(2004) analyze some of these proposals but not within the EU ETS context and only the 
former paper takes into account the CO2 leakage induced to assess the economic efficiency. 
The present paper required the development of a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 
featuring four sectors – Cement, Aluminium, Steel and Electricity, hence the name CASE – 
linked through electricity and CO2 markets. By using a partial equilibrium model, we know 
that we do not account for pre-existing distortions or macroeconomic feedbacks – on world 
energy prices for example. However, when such mechanisms are of importance, we use 
insights from papers based on general equilibrium models to draw more robust conclusions.  
When assessing the impacts of climate policies, it would be misleading to treat the industry as 
a homogenous sector. Indeed, the industrial sectors differ by their CO2 intensity, their trade 
exposure or their emissions abatement potentials. CASE features a higher level of 
disaggregation than most general equilibrium models, which are limited by GTAP or similar 
                                                 
4 We only combine BTA with AU and not with GF or OB because the latter two would be politically difficult to 
defend: EU exporters would receive a subsidy despite paying no allowances for their emissions. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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databases. It allows us to highlight the contrasted impacts of climate policies among EU 
sectors. Smale et al. (2006) or Criqui et al. (2005) use detailed partial equilibrium models to 
study some of the impacts of the EU ETS but they do not compare different allocation 
methods.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, through a simple analytical 
framework, we highlight the different incentives provided by the allocation methods as well 
as their economic efficiency. Section 3 presents the CASE model, whose parameters are 
gathered in an appendix. Results are displayed in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
The EU greenhouse gas ETS has started operating in January 2005, following Directive 
2003/87/EC. It covers combustion installations over 20 MW – mostly, but not only, in the 
power sector – oil refineries and the production of steel, cement, glass, lime, bricks, pulp and 
paper. Currently process emissions from the chemical and aluminium sectors are excluded, 
as well as other gases than CO2. Around 11 500 installations gathering 45% of EU CO2 
emissions are concerned.  
Most emission allowances are allocated for free. Every Member State draws a National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) which specifies the amount of allowances received by every 
installation on its territory. NAPs may be rejected by the European Commission if the latter 
considers that they violate the Directive or other European laws, especially provisions on 
State aid. NAPs also precise the way new installations will receive allowances and for how 
long closing installations will continue to receive them. These provisions differ across 
Member States. 
Not only does the industry contribute to climate change through its direct emissions of 
greenhouse gases but it uses electricity whose production also generates GHG emissions – 










Figure 1. 2005 ETS emissions (source: Kettner et al., 2007) 
Box 1: EU ETS 
 
2. Grandfathering, auctioning and output-based allocation: the core differences 
The way tradable allowances are allocated (e.g. whether they are auctioned or freely Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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distributed) is sometimes believed to have only a distributional impact
5. This is true only 
under some strict assumptions. In particular, if the amount of allowances a firm gets depends 
on its current behaviour, the firm may alter the latter to get more allowances.  
In this section whose aim is pedagogical, we define three allowance allocation methods – 
auctioning, grandfathering and output-based allocation – and we compare them to the optimal 
policy with a very simple model, which closely follows Fischer (2001). This allows us to 
show, from the first-order conditions of profit maximisation, how the different allocation 
methods impact firms' decision rules, CO2 price, production and unitary abatement.  
 
2.1. Optimal policy 
Let us assume a one-sector closed economy with perfect competition. Because of the 
assumption of closed economy, we cannot distinguish in this section AU from our fourth 
policy option, AU-BTA. This assumption is relaxed in next sections. The benevolent planner 
chooses the levels of production and unitary abatement that maximise welfare, i.e., the 





ua Q MaxW P q dq C ua Q =− ∫  (1) 
s.t. () 0 ue ua Q E −≤ , (2) 
where P[q] is the inverse demand function, Q the production level, C the marginal production 
cost, assumed constant with production but increasing with unitary abatement ua 
( [ ] [ ] 0, ' 0 Cu a C u a >> ),  ue0 the baseline unitary emissions and E the emission target. 
Assuming that the latter is binding, the benevolent planner would choose ua and Q according 
to the first-order conditions: 
[ ] ' Cu a λ =  (3) 
[ ] () 0 P C ua ue ua λ =+−  (4) 
Equation (3) shows that the marginal cost of abatement equals the shadow price of the 
constraint  λ   and equation (4) that the planner would set the output level such that the 
marginal benefit of another unit of output (the price) equals the marginal production cost plus 
the shadow price of the constraint multiplied by unitary emissions ( 0 ue ue ua ≡− ). In other 
words, the price includes the value of the emissions embodied in a unit of production. 
   
2.2. Grandfathering (GF) and auctioning (AU) 
In these allocation methods, the amount of allowances a firm gets is unaffected by its 
behaviour. Under auctioning this amount is nil, whereas under grandfathering it is strictly 
positive. 
A representative firm would maximise its profit: 
                                                 
5 Tietenberg (2002: 3) makes this case as follows: "Whatever the initial allocation, the transferability of the 
permits allows them to ultimately flow to their highest valued uses. Since those uses do not depend on the initial 
allocation, all initial allocations result in the same outcome and that outcome is cost-effective".  Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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CO ua Q Max P C ua Q P ue ua Q gf Π= − − − − , (5) 
where gf is the amount of free allowances grandfathered. Under full auctioning, gf equals 0. 
First-order conditions give:  
[ ]
2 ' CO Cu a P =  (6) 
[ ] ()
2 0 CO PC u a P u e u a =+ −  (7) 
We get the optimal conditions (3) and (4), with 
2 CO P λ = . Equation (6) is the classical 
equalization of the marginal abatement cost with the CO2 price. In equation (7) we see that the 
output price equals the sum of the marginal production cost and of the value of the emissions 
per unit of output: although all allowances are given for free, firms behave as if they had to 
buy them – allowances have an opportunity cost. Consequently gf does not appear in the first-
order conditions, which are identical for AU and GF. It follows, from equation (5), that the 
profit under GF is higher than that under AU and that the difference amounts to 
2 CO Pg f ⋅ . 
 
2.3. Output-based allocation (OB) 
Under OB, the allocation a firm gets is proportional to its output level. Throughout the present 
paper, we assume that it does not depend on the technology used
6. 
The profit function under OB may be written: 
[ ] () ()
2 0 ,
OB
CO ua Q Max P C ua Q P ue ua ob Q Π= − − − − , (8) 
where ob is the unitary allocation. First-order conditions of profit maximisation give: 
[ ]
2 ' CO Cu a P =  (9) 
[ ] ()
2 0 CO PC u a P u e u ao b =+ − −  (10) 
Since for the average firm  0 ob ue ua =− , we get: 
[ ] PC u a =  (11) 
For a given CO2 price, the unitary abatement under OB equals the one under GF or AU 
(equations 9 and 6). However the output price simply equals the marginal production cost, 
whereas under GF and AU it equals the sum of the marginal production cost and of the value 
of the emissions embodied in one unit of production (equations 11 and 7). The product price 
is thus lower under OB hence (if the demand function is not completely inelastic) the 
production level Q is higher. Let us now turn to the equilibrium on the allowance market: 
( ) 2 0 CO E Q ue ua P ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  (12) 
                                                 
6 This assumption is important as it guarantees that OB and GF or AU lead to the same shares for the various 
technologies in new investments (see for example Neuhoff, 2005). Hence it will allow us to use the same 
Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for the various policies. It is worth noting however that, in the power sector, 
we may assume that the operators of non-fossil plants, i.e. nuclear and renewable plants, get no allowance. 
Indeed, the nuclear and renewable capacity may be seen as unaffected by the ETS, on the ground that it depends 
on political State-level decisions and/or on State subsidies.  Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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Where  [ ]
2 ,0 0 ,' 0 CO ua P ua ua ⎡⎤ => ⎣⎦  is the unitary abatement expressed as a function of the 
CO2 price. This can be rewritten: 
2 0 CO ua P ue E Q ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ , (13) 
Since OB leads to a higher Q, it follows that for a given emission target, it also leads to a 
higher ua hence a higher PCO2 than GF or AU.  
To sum up, GF and AU lead to the optimal levels of production and unitary emissions 
whereas OB leads to too much production and too much unitary abatement. It also leads to a 
higher CO2 price than GF and AU
7.  
Given this shortcoming, why is a switch to OB advocated by some stakeholders? OB does 
also have some pros; first, since production is less impacted, so is employment in the sectors 
covered. Second, because the product price raises less, the adverse impact on consumers is 
mitigated. Third, OB may reduce the loss in competitiveness hence CO2 leakage (Haites, 
2003). In short, under OB, emissions are mainly reduced through unitary abatement – first of 
all through technical solutions – which makes it a popular option among industrials. 
Conversely, under GF and AU, a part of the emissions reduction is due to a decrease in the 
output of CO2-intensive goods, which may be economically efficient but is for sure unpopular 
in the industries concerned. 
Obviously the very simple model presented above cannot capture many of the interesting 
features of the EU ETS. First, the latter links several sectors that differ e.g. as regards their 
abatement ability and demand elasticity, so some sectors are net buyers and others net sellers 
of allowances (Fischer, 2001). Second, some sectors are not only impacted directly through 
the CO2 price but also indirectly through a possible impact on the electricity price. Third, 
some sectors are exposed to international competition, hence the need to model the 
substitution between EU and foreign products. Taking into account these features requires a 
numerical model, which is presented in the next section. 
 
3. The CASE model 
CASE is a static and partial equilibrium model which represents around 2015
8, i.e. the mid-
term of the 3
rd phase of the EU ETS, three sectors covered by the EU ETS, electricity, cement 
and steel, and one which is not, aluminium. The aluminium sector is electric-intensive: 
whereas its direct emissions are not covered by the ETS, it is impacted through the rise in 
electricity prices.  
The last two sectors being not as homogeneous as the first two, it is worth specifying their 
perimeters. Our aluminium sector only covers primary aluminium, international trade 
occurring mainly at this stage of transformation. We do not consider secondary aluminium, 
i.e. recycled aluminium, which is around ten times less energy and GHG intensive and whose 
market is mainly influenced by the scrap availability issue. For the steel sector, we aggregate 
long and flat end-products which constitute, until now, the bulk of steel trade. 
The three sectors of the EU ETS modelled in CASE represent around 75% of the emissions 
covered by the system. They were also chosen because they should be impacted quite 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that OB is, in fine, an output subsidy. That’s why, under imperfect competition, OB may 
offset the under production from firms, and might thus increase social welfare (Fischer, 2001).  
 
8 2015 because of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curves used which assume a 10 years time horizon. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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differently by the ETS given that many determining elements differ across sectors
9: 
- their CO2 intensity: cement has the highest direct plus indirect emissions over turnover ratio, 
followed by electricity and by far by steel. This ratio is low for aluminium if we do not 
consider its direct emissions which are not covered, intermediate otherwise. 
-  their CO2 abatement potential: for a given CO2 price, power generators and steel 
manufacturers are able to decrease their unitary emissions at a much higher rate than cement 
producers according to the PRIMES (Blok et al., 2001) model. For every sector, we fit a 
linear-quadratic function from the results of the model. 
- the international competition they are subjected to: trade exposure – defined as exports as a 
percentage of production, plus imports as a percentage of consumption – equals around 60% 
for the EU Aluminium sector, 20% for steel, 10% for cement and 0% for electricity.  
-  the price elasticity of demand: aluminium, steel and cement demands are generally 
considered as more elastic than electricity demand. 
In the model, all sectors are first linked through the electricity market (Figure 2). The steel, 
cement and electricity sectors are also linked through the CO2 market. The CO2 price clears 
the market: thanks to unitary abatement and production drop, the sum of the emissions from 
these sectors equals the total amount of allowances given for free or auctioned
10. The steel, 
aluminium and cement sectors are linked to the rest of the world through product competition. 
An appendix presents the values and sources for all variables. 
To build the BAU scenario, we assume that the growth rates of production and of unitary 
emissions (emissions/production) remains the same as in the last ten years. 
We do not model emissions in the rest of the ETS, nor emissions outside the ETS. These 
emissions could differ across our scenarios, due to some indirect effects (e.g. substitution 
between electricity and gas in building heating), but this effect is probably limited. 
An important additional assumption is that there is no climate policy in the rest of the world. 
This is not the most likely scenario, but taking this pessimistic assumption allows assessing 
the consequences of the EU ETS in the worst case. 
 
                                                 
9 All the following insights and figures are from computation based on the data given in appendix. 
10 We thus neglect CDM, JI hence we overestimate the CO2 price and competitiveness impact of the ETS. We 
also neglect banking which has an ambiguous impact on CO2 price. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
  9
 
Figure 2: Sectoral links in the CASE model 
 
All sectors are modelled in the same way. The equations of the sectoral sub-models are listed 
in box 2 and explained below. For EU variables we use the subscript e, for RoW variables we 
use the subscript r. A superscript 0 means the value of the variable in BaU. 
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Equation M1 is similar to equation (10) in the analytical model above. It states that the long-
term marginal production cost (ce) is constant with respect to production and increases, 
compared to its value in the BaU scenario, by the unitary abatement cost (uace), by the rise in 
electricity cost (ece) and by emission cost i.e. the value of emissions minus – under OB – the 
allowances distributed.  
M2 is the usual equalisation of the marginal abatement cost, assumed quadratic, and fitted to 
the results of the PRIMES model (Blok et al., 2001). M3 follows directly. 
M4 states that the increase in electricity cost is simply the rise in electricity price 
(endogenous) times the unitary electric consumption (uele). Hence, we do not take into 
account the fact that some industrials produce their own electricity – around 20% of EU 
aluminium producers for example (Carbon Trust, 2004) – and the role of long term power 
supply contracts. Moreover, we do not consider electricity abatement opportunities. 
M5 and M6 state that the prices set by EU producers at home (Pee) and abroad (Per) increase 
by the rise in their marginal cost. By this we assume a complete pass-through. Admittedly, 
these industries are imperfectly competitive, which may entail an incomplete pass-through 
because such firms may absorb a part of their cost increase in order to maintain output 
(Dornbusch, 1987). Yet Stennek and Verboven (2001) conclude that in the long run, sales 
taxes are fully passed on to consumers. A second reason for incomplete pass-through may be 
international competition, which reinforces the previous effect by increasing the elasticity of 
each firm's own demand. Unfortunately, whereas there are some estimates of the pass-through 
rates on exports markets following a cost increase, no such quantification exist for the 
domestic market. Whatsoever, the partial absorption of marginal cost increase by a firm only 
makes sense for a low cost increase, i.e. which does not lead to the collapse of the profit 
margin. For these reasons we do not assume that international competition limits the pass-
through: EU firms pass 100% of their cost increase into their prices whatever the cost 
variation.  
M7 states that under AU-BTA, a rebate sBTA covers the emission cost. This rebate, as well as 
the tax on imports to the EU, equals the value of the average direct plus indirect unitary 
emissions in Europe. Doing so, we do not model the “pure” BTA system defined in 
introduction but a system close to the one proposed by Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) which has 
the advantage, according to the authors, to be compatible with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization
11.  
M8 states that the demand for each good is linear. The price-elasticity of demand in the BaU 
scenario is taken from Oxera (2004). Note that we do not take into account the cross-price 
elasticities among the materials impacted by the EU ETS, which are most likely positive: 
steel, bricks and cement are substitutes in buildings, steel, aluminium and glass in packaging, 
steel and aluminium in transport materials… Hence we probably overestimate the decrease in 
demand caused by the EU ETS. For electricity, demand is the sum of the demand from the 
three other sectors modelled and of a linear demand from the rest of the economy
12. 
M9 states that except in the electricity sector, we rely on the Armington (1969) specification, 
σ  being the Armington elasticity
13. In the electricity sector we assume neither imports nor 
                                                 
11  Ismer and Neuhoff tax/subsidize products as if they were produced with the best and widely available 
technologies in the EU – to make BTA compatible with WTO rules. Testing this BTA would require a detailed 
technological analysis of sectors, what is beyond the scope of this paper. However, according to some sensitivity 
tests we made, the differences should not be very significant. 
12 For simplicity, we do not display this equation in box 2. 
13 The underlying assumption is that goods produced in the EU and in the RoW are imperfect substitutes. Such a Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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exports because at the EU level they are negligible. We stress that the econometric 
estimations of Armington elasticities are short to medium run; hence they might not capture 
long term effects like the partial relocation of capital which becomes mobile in the long run. 
M10 and M11 derive from M9, they give the market shares of EU and RoW producers in the 
EU market. 




In this section, we assume that the rates of unitary allocation under OB or of free allocation 
under GF are the same across all sectors of the ETS. In other words, if the cement sector 
receives under OB a unitary allocation which equals 95% of its unitary emission under BaU, 
all sectors receive the same rate. If it receives for free an amount of allowances accounting for 
95% of its 2005 emissions under GF, all sectors receive the same rate. It is worth noting that, 
in the real world, the electricity sector tends to receive much less than others, at least in most 
of the EU countries (Buchner et al., 2006). 
 
4.1. CO2 price and channels to reduce emissions 
As we have seen previously, in a closed economy there are two channels to reduce EU 
emissions:  
- the unitary abatement channel, i.e. the reduction in unitary emissions of CO2-intensive 
goods; 
- the production channel, i.e. the reduction in the production of such goods. 
In an open economy the production channel has to be split between the consumption channel, 
i.e. the drop of EU consumption due to higher prices, and the trade channel, i.e. the relocation 
of the production of CO2-intensive goods in the rest of the world. If the latter is efficient to 
reduce EU emissions, it leads to CO2 leakage, hence challenges the environmental efficiency 
of the system. Figure 3 displays for various sectors and policies the share of the channels to 
reduce the emissions covered by the EU ETS by 15% compared to 2005. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
statement might seem doubtful especially for a product like cement which is seen as homogeneous throughout 
the world. However, even if one assumes that the cement produced in Turkey is the same as the cement produced 
in France, the quantity of Turkish cement available in France and its price fluctuate with the economic growth in 
Turkey, international transportation costs, exchange rate… Therefore, the service provided by French cement 
manufacturers differs from the RoW in the price stability and security of supply. It may also differ in the help 
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Figure 3. Share of the channels to reduce the emissions covered by the EU ETS by 15% 
compared to 2005 
 
First, it turns out that the role of every channel varies a lot with sectors. According to 
PRIMES, the ability of cement manufacturer to reduce emissions is low. Hence, under GF or 
AU, the unitary abatement channel plays a minor role in this sector, whereas it is predominant 
in the steel and electricity sectors. Moreover, the production channel is dominated by the 
consumption channel in the cement sector, given its low trade sensitivity
14, and before all in 
the electricity sector. Conversely, the trade channel dominates the production channel in the 
steel sector which is more trade sensitive.  
If one aggregates sectors, hence one takes into account the weight of the electricity sector, GF 
and AU rely at 70% on unitary abatement and at less than 5% on trade to reduce EU ETS 
emissions. The share of the latter channel drops to 0 under AU-BTA, which thus requires 
further efforts in unitary abatement to achieve the same emission reduction target. Such 
efforts are also necessary under OB, the production channel falling to around than 5% because 
of the low impact of this allocation methodology on all good prices, and under OB-AU, the 
production channel falling to less than 25% because of the low impact on cement and steel 
prices. 
Further reductions in unitary emissions necessitating higher CO2 prices, to provide the 
adequate price signal to firms, the CO2 price under AU-BTA, OB-AU and before all under 
OB are higher than under AU or GF: around +10%, +25% and +70% respectively for a 15% 
ETS emission reduction. CO2 prices are displayed on the following graph. 
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Figure 4: CO2 price for the five policy options 
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Figure 5: Average annual production growth ratio from 2005 to 2015  
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4.2.1. Sectoral production losses under AU or GF 
The cement sector is not particularly trade sensitive and neither is its demand especially 
elastic to price. However, its high CO2-intensity leads it to be the sector with the highest 
production drop under AU or GF. For a 15% ETS emission reduction, a sound target for 
2015
15, its average production growth is close to nil whereas it is around 2% under BAU. 
Nevertheless, the sector’s production keeps on increasing and higher targets would be 
required to make it drop. Moreover, it is worth noting that around 15% of production losses 
compared with BAU are due to market share losses vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Production 
losses are mainly due to a reduction in EU cement consumption. Hence, the production and 
related employment issues in the cement sector are not that much a matter of competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign producers. 
The slowdown of the production growth in the other sectors is lower. In the steel sector, the 
growth ratio falls “only” from around 2 to 1% for a 15% cut in the EU ETS emission, in spite 
of its relatively high price demand elasticity and to its trade exposure. It is due to its relatively 
low CO2-intensity. In this sector around 3/4 of the production drop is due to market share 
losses. The picture is quite similar for the aluminium sector. Concerning the electricity sector, 
its CO2 intensity is offset by a relatively inelastic demand and because it is sheltered from the 
competition of non EU producers.  
 
4.2.2. Impacts on production of the different policies 
As seen previously, AU-BTA leads to slightly higher CO2 prices than AU or GF, hence a 
higher price increase and a lower consumption in the electricity sector. Moreover, in the other 
sectors opened to trade, prices are higher because non EU products are taxed at the border. 
Conversely, almost all the production losses through trade vanish. Finally, these sectors incur 
slightly lower losses than under AU, the latter effect dominating.  
OB has the same kind of impact as AU-BTA on trade flows: roughly speaking, the relative 
price of EU vs. foreign producers increases only marginally, at least for low targets. 
Conversely, the absolute price for EU consumers hardly rises compared with BAU, so 
consumption is almost not impacted. Finally, OB leads to almost negligible production losses 
for all sectors and low targets. For high targets however, the production growth in the steel 
and before all the cement sectors is significantly reduced. Indeed, both sectors and especially 
the latter have to buy allowances (to the electricity sector) to compensate their relatively low 
ability to decrease their unitary emissions. Hence their production cost and their prices 
significantly increase. 
Compared with OB, the auction of allowances to electricity generators under OB-AU reduces 
the emission cost of cement and steel manufacturers – as the CO2 price is lower – but raises 
their electricity cost. Depending on the relative size of the emission and electricity cost, the 
manufacturers see their production cost increasing and their production slowing (steel), or the 
opposite (cement). For the electricity and the aluminium, the impact on production is clearer: 
it is similar as under AU or GF and even increased as the CO2 price raises. 
 
4.3. CO2 leakage 
As we have just seen, the EU ETS leads to market share losses in the sectors which are trade 
                                                 
15 The EU has recently announced a 20% unilateral emission reduction target for 2020 compared with 1990, 
whereas it is supposed to reduce its emissions by 8% around 2010. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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sensitive. These losses induce CO2 leakage, i.e. an increase in CO2 emissions from non EU 
countries, where production is globally more CO2-intensive. We label this source of leakage 
the "competitiveness channel"
16. The leakage ratio of a sector is defined as the increase in the 
direct and indirect emissions from this sector in the RoW over the decrease in direct and 
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Figure 6: CO2 leakage 
 
4.3.1. Sectoral CO2 leakage under AU or GF 
Being not subjected to international competition, the leakage ratio of the electricity sector 
equals zero and is not displayed here. It does not mean that the electricity sector in the RoW 
does not increase its emissions. Actually, it does because its production increases to satisfy 
the rise in demand of the other sectors from the RoW, which gain some market shares. 
However, in our sectoral leakage estimates, indirect emissions are assigned to the electricity 
consumers. 
As we have seen previously, the EU Aluminium sector is trade sensitive: around 40% of its 
drop in production is due to trade, hence is offset by a rise in production abroad which is more 
CO2 intensive. Moreover, being not covered by the ETS, EU aluminium manufacturers do not 
have an incentive to decrease their unitary emissions. These two elements should lead to a 
                                                 
16 We stress that our estimates of the leakage ratio do not include one of the main leakage channels, the increase 
in RoW emissions due to the international drop in world fuel prices induced by climate policies (Sijm et al. 
2004). However this "trade in energy channel" is similar for the four policies assessed, they only differ in the 
competitiveness channel for leakage, so we are able to compare the leakage ratios across policies. Conversely 
this channel may vary across sectors because their energy intensities and fuel mixes differ, hence when we 
compare across sectors the leakage ratios we have to be aware that we only compare their different contribution 
to the competitiveness channel, what remains worthy. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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very high leakage ratio. However, indirect emissions of the sector, which represent around 2/3 
of its total emissions, decrease thanks to the important improvements made in the electricity 
generation: finally, the leakage rate is around 30% for a 15% emission reduction. 
In the cement sector, we have seen that around 15% of the production drop in the EU is offset 
by a rise abroad. The – low – improvements in unitary emissions just offset the higher CO2 
intensity of cement production in the ROW and the leakage ratio is around 20%. 
The fact that the improvements in direct unitary emissions are not so expensive for steel 
manufacturers – they are responsible for more than half of the CO2 emissions reduction in this 
sector, partially offset their trade sensitivity highlighted previously. Hence, the leakage ratio 
in the EU steel sector is the highest, around 45%, but is lower than one may have feared. 
In aggregate, the leakage ratio of the EU ETS is low, around 8%, what traduces the weight of 
the electricity sector. 
 
4.3.2. EU ETS CO2 leakage for the different policies 
Globally, leakage ratios are much lower under OB, OB-AU and AU-BTA. It drops to around 
2% under OB: as highlighted in Demailly and Quirion (2006) OB is an efficient tool to 
prevent leakage. Unsurprisingly, leakage ratios under OB-AU are close to the ratio under AU 
for the aluminium sector, and to the ratios under OB for the cement and steel sectors. Finally, 
it prevents leakage almost as much as OB. 
Under AU-BTA, the leakage ratio is negative, around -2%, because net imports tend to 
decrease with AU-BTA. This drop is not due to the fact that EU producers gain market shares 
at home, the non EU producers being taxed in accordance with the CO2 intensity of EU 
producers while experiencing no abatement costs. For the same reason, neither do the formers 
gain market shares abroad. The drop in net imports is due to the decrease in consumption of 
EU consumers, which more than offset the gains in market shares of foreign firms. 
 
4.7. Overall economic cost 
In this paper, welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, firms’ profit and State 
revenue (when allowances are auctioned). It does not include the impacts of CO2 emissions. 
Neither does it include the dynamic cost due to workers retraining for example. The economic 
cost of the five policy options is defined as the loss in welfare they entail in 2015 compared to 
business-as-usual.  
A caveat is that we do not take into account pre-existing distortions and the impact of our five 
policies on them when ranking the latter: distortions due to taxes on the one hand, due to the 
difference between price and marginal cost – imperfect competition – what is common in the 
industry considered, on the other hand. These distortions being of importance, especially the 
former, we use insights from papers analysing their impacts to draw more robust conclusions.  
In this section, we first analyze the economic cost of the four policies from the EU point of 
view only. That is, we compute the EU welfare losses for the various policies as a function of 
the emission reduction in the EU only. Then, we enlarge our vision to assess the efficiency of 
the policies from a more global point of view: we take into account the CO2 leakage and the 
impacts of these policies on the RoW. 
 Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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Figure 7:Impact on EU Welfare of the five policy options. Left panel: as a percentage of 
BAU welfare. Right panel: as a proportion of the welfare cost of AU or GF 
 
Unsurprisingly, AU or GF lead to the lowest welfare losses for the EU, followed by OB-AU 
and AU-BTA, which are close, and by OB. The first explanation has already been presented 
above: for a given target, OB entails too much production and too much unitary abatement; so 
does OB-AU in the cement and steel sectors; AU-BTA entails too much production as it does 
not use the trade channel, which is efficient as long as we do not take into account the CO2 
emissions increase in the RoW. A second explanation is that AU and GF create a significant 
wealth transfer from the RoW to the EU, whereas the other three policies do not, or only to a 
much lower extent. 
Indeed, under AU or GF, the increase in price paid by foreign consumers for traded EU 
products – cement, steel and aluminium directly, electricity indirectly – entails a wealth 
transfer from foreign consumers to the EU budget (under AU) or to EU firms (under GF). 
This mechanism is labelled “terms of trade effect” in the literature. In CASE and for low 
emission reductions – around 5% – this effect is strong enough to improve the EU welfare 
under AU and GF, which can be hardly seen on the graph: this is why these policies are so 
cost efficient for low targets compared to the others. Note that the same phenomenon occurs 
in Bernard and Vielle (2003) general equilibrium model. In their paper as in ours, for more 
stringent targets the negative impact on EU consumers dominates and this "double dividend" 
disappears.  
Under OB, the increase in price for EU products paid by foreign consumers – hence the 
wealth transfer – is much lower, although it becomes significant for high targets – steel and 
before all cement manufacturers buying allowances to the electricity producers to compensate 
their lower ability to reduce unitary emissions. 
Under OB-AU, a part of the wealth transfer which occurs under AU is conserved, as the 
increase in prices of aluminium and electricity is preserved. This part is significant but small 
as the main sectors which benefits from this transfer under AU are cement and steel. 
Under AU-BTA, the wealth transfer from the RoW is due to the fact that the EU budget 
benefits from a transfer from foreign firms, through the tax on imports. However, this remains 
marginal.  
Thus, the various climate policies differ according to their “wealth transfer effect” and to their 
“channels effect”, i.e. their different use of emission reduction channels. It turns out that the 
former dominates for low emission targets. Indeed, as one may see on Figure 8, when one 
takes into account both effects, OB, OB-AU and AU-BTA are around 70%, 30% and 30% Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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more costly than AU or GF respectively for the most stringent target considered. These gaps 
more than double for a 15% emission reduction target. If one abstracts from the wealth 
transfer effect by taking into account welfare losses from the RoW, relative gaps among 
policies are much lower (and stable): OB is 30% more costly than AU or GF, 10% more for 
AU-BTA and less than 10% more for OB-AU, for a 15% emission reduction. 
It is worth noting that OB-AU and AU-BTA yield almost the same cost in terms of EU 
welfare: the low use of the production channel in the former for the cement and steel sectors is 
offset by a higher wealth transfer and the fact that the latter does not use at all the trade 
channel. 
 
4.7.2. Adopting a global perspective 
If one wants to assess the cost efficiency of various climate polices from a global perspective, 
it is fair to take into account the CO2 leakage which deteriorates the environmental 
effectiveness of some climate policies. That is why we compute the cost of the various 
policies including leakage: for example, if a 10% decrease in EU ETS emissions entails a 5% 
leakage, we consider that the effective emission reduction in the EU ETS is 10-
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Figure 8: EU welfare loss from the five policy options, including leakage. Left panel: as a 
percentage of BAU welfare. Right panel: as a proportion of the welfare cost of AU or GF 
 
Including leakage, the cost efficiency of AU, GF, OB and OB-AU deteriorate, especially the 
two former as they entail higher leakage ratios. AU-BTA, which leads to a slight spillover, 
improves. Given the globally low CO2 leakage, AU or GF remain the best option for low to 
intermediate targets, although the gaps with the other policies decrease For the most stringent 
target considered here, AU-BTA is slightly more efficient than AU or GF, and OB-AU 
slightly less efficient. 
However, adopting a global perspective, it is fair not only to consider CO2 leakage but also 
the impact of EU policies on the world welfare, i.e. to add to the EU welfare losses the losses 
from the RoW (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9: World welfare loss from the five policy options, including leakage. Left panel: 
as a percentage of BAU EU welfare. Right panel: as a proportion of the welfare cost of 
AU or GF 
 
Factoring out the wealth transfer effect from the various policies, OB-AU, OB and even more 
AU-BTA improve compared with AU or GF as they induce lower wealth transfer. Finally, 
from this global perspective, AU-BTA is the most efficient policy whatever the emission 
reduction: it is around 20% less costly than AU or GF. OB-AU turns to be roughly as efficient 
as AU or GF while OB remains around 20% more costly. 
How would the previous rankings be impacted if we had taken into account pre-existing 
distortions? Literature, using general equilibrium models, has shown that “policies that raise 
revenues and use these revenues to finance cuts in pre-existing distorting taxes have lower 
costs than policies that do not generate and recycle revenues in this way.” (Bovenberg et al., 
2005). Hence, if the auction revenue were used to cut taxes, the performance of GF would 
deteriorate vis-à-vis revenue-raising policies.  
Output-based allocation does not raise revenue hence does not allow to reduce pre-existing 
taxes. However, it partly reduces the negative impact of such taxes on production, since it 
constitutes an implicit production subsidy. In Goulder et al. (1999), the introduction of pre-
existing distorting taxes does not change the relative cost of AU and OB, but it dramatically 
raises the cost of GF compared to the other policies. Hence, one may consider that pre-
existing distorting taxes would not change the relative costs of AU, AU-BTA, OB-AU and 
OB while severely deteriorating GF. 
It is fair to stress that the implicit production subsidy when allowances are output-based may 
be beneficial in imperfectly competitive industry, where firms underprovide output. However, 
as stressed by Fischer (2001), gains are uncertain for various reasons, in particular because 
quantifying market power is difficult
17.  
 
                                                 
17 As it has been enhanced by various authors when comparing GF, AU and OB (Goulder et al., 1999), the cost 
differences among policies depend importantly on the emission reduction target. However, according to CASE, 
the Goulder et al. (1999)'s result that the higher the target, the lower the difference, does not hold. If it is true that 
the costs converge for very high targets not displayed here (for a zero emission target, all unitary emissions must 
equal zero, hence the production channel is nil), it is the opposite for the lower targets presented in this 
subsection. Actually, the evolution of the relative cost of OB and the other policies with the target depends on 
the relative evolutions of the unitary abatement and production channels. For example, by just modifying the 
form of the electricity MACC one may get the opposite conclusion. Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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4.5. Distributive impacts 
The previous section has focused on the overall economic cost of policies. This one deals 
briefly with the sharing of the burden among EU stakeholders – firms, consumers and state – 
when one does not take into account leakage
18.  
Given our assumption of 100% pass-through, firms make no profit with the implementation of 
climate policies, except under GF. Under GF, firms’ profit equals the value of the allowances 
given to them for free. This value increases with the strengthening of the emission reduction 
target, i.e. the reduction in the amount of allowances is more than compensated by the rise of 
the CO2 price. For a 15% emission reduction, firms’ profit is close to 20 billion €, of which 15 
for electricity generation, 2.5 for steel and 2.5 for cement. This means that the net profit 
margin (profit/total production cost) increases by 7 percentage points. This gain is in the 
detriment of the consumers whose surplus drops by almost 10% for the same target. Such a 
policy option thus entails a huge wealth transfer from consumers to producers. 
Under AU and AU-BTA, the State instead of firms benefit from the ETS. Hence, the impact 
on the consumers and the burden sharing depends on how policy makers will use the auction 
revenue. If it is all rebated to consumers, the surplus of the latter is marginally impacted. If it 
is not, the impact is high, as under GF.  
Under OB-AU, consumers benefit from the output-based allocation to steel and before all to 
cement producers compared with AU, although this benefit remains modest in aggregate State 
revenue only slightly deteriorates for low targets: if on the one hand the amount of allowances 
auctioned is lower, on the other hand the CO2 price is higher. 
Under OB, neither the State nor the firms benefit from the ETS. The impact on EU consumers 
is negative but low. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess five proposals for the future of the EU ETS: pure grandfathering 
allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), 
auctioning with border tax adjustments (AU-BTA) and finally output-based allocation in 
sectors exposed to international competition and auctioning in electricity generation (OB-
AU). The CASE model, developed for this paper, represents four industries: Cement, 
Aluminium, Steel and Electricity. This high level of disaggregation allows us not to treat the 
industry as homogenous but to highlight the diversity of the sectors and the contrasted 
impacts of the EU ETS on them. 
For an emission reduction of up to 15% in 2015 compared to 2005, production still increases, 
although less than in the BAU scenario, in all four sectors and for all policy proposals. This is 
not true anymore for more stringent targets in the cement sector under GF, AU or AU-BTA. 
Emission reduction is mostly due to unitary abatement, except in the cement sector under GF, 
AU and AU-BTA, in which case the drop in consumption is the main factor. The leakage 
ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, goes from 
around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BTA. At the sectoral level, these ratios vary 
greatly from 0 for the electricity sector to almost 50% for steel. 
In the light of our results, which policy option is the most attractive? Firstly, although GF 
                                                 
18 In the end, all the costs are unavoidably distributed to households in their various capacities as workers, 
consumers, investors and taxpayers. A general equilibrium model would be needed to assess how firms' profits 
would be distributed to households. See Dinan and Rogers (2002). Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
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performs well in terms of overall economic cost, its distributive consequences are highly 
regressive since it creates huge windfall profits, in particular for electricity producers, at the 
expense of consumers. Moreover, it is well-know that pre-existing distorting taxes (not 
included in our model) raise the cost of GF compared to the other options. Secondly, OB is 
more costly than the other options, even accounting for its ability to reduce CO2 leakage. This 
higher cost is due to its inefficient balance between the two main mechanisms to reduce 
emissions: the decrease in unitary emissions and the decrease in production. OB leads to too 
much of the former and too little of the latter. 
This leaves the policy-maker with three options: AU, OB-AU and AU-BTA. According to our 
results, if we only take into account EU welfare, AU is the most efficient option. If one 
accounts for CO2 leakage, it remains true for low targets but, for more stringent ones, the 
three options leads to similar costs. If the metric is the world welfare, AU-BTA is the most 
efficient and the other two options yield a similar, slightly higher, cost whatever the emission 
reduction target. Hence the choice among these three options may rely more on political 
acceptability and feasibility considerations than on the relative cost of the options. There is no 
doubt that AU will be fiercely opposed by most of the CO2-intensive industry, especially 
those exposed to international competition. OB-AU and AU-BTA could be more acceptable 
since they would drastically mitigate the competitive disadvantage of these industries vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. As we have seen, in our model both options yield a rather similar 
overall cost so the choice should rely on other arguments.  
Indeed, both options have pros and cons not taken into account in our model. Output-based 
allocation, on the positive side, allows emancipating from uncertain production growth 
projections during the process of allocation negotiation, which may be used to negotiate or to 
justify high emission caps. On the other hand, the development of such benchmarks is far 
from simple. In particular, the definition of an output is problematic, even for a relatively 
homogenous product like cement. Moreover this definition may have drastic consequences 
when intermediary CO2 intensive products which may be traded internationally enter the 
manufacturing process. Turning to AU-BTA, border adjustment may be challenged in front of 
the WTO with an uncertain outcome, but would give an incentive to non EU countries, and 
more precisely non Kyoto ratifying countries, to engage more in the fight against climate 
change, as highlighted by Stiglitz (2006). 
 Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
  23












Prices = production costs 
Prices (€) 
 
47 313  64 1600 
Source  Reinaud (2004)  
Trade and Demand elasticities 
Armington elasticity - 6  2  2 
Source 
Average values in Donnelly et al. (2004), Gallaway and McDaniel 
(2003), Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992), Shiells and Reinert (1993), 
Bishop (2004), Romali (2004) 
Price  elasticity of 
demand at the BAU 
equilibrium
21 
0.4 0.6  0.8  0.8 
Source  Best guess in Hepburn et al. (2006)  Oxera (2004) 
CO2 Emissions 
2005 EU direct 
unitary emissions 
(tCO2) 
0.370 0.880  0.800  3.5 
Source  ETS Emission from Knetter et al. (2007) over 
production  Reinaud (2004) 
Yearly 
improvement (%)  2 1.3 1.3  - 
Source  Computations from ENERDATA and EEA data  - 
2005 RoW Direct 
unitary emissions 
(tCO2) 
0.560 0.980  0.880  3.5 





Batelle (2002)  Reinaud (2004) 
2005 unitary electric  - 0.4  0.103  15.2 
                                                 
19 Electricity generation requires the use of much diverse technologies than in other industries. That’s why we 
stress that the data for this sector are average values. 
20 Reinaud distinguishes the BOF and EAF routes for steel making. We aggregate the data by summing them, 
weighted by their shares in total production capacity of EU and non EU countries (IISI, 2006). 
21 Since demand curves are linear rather than isoelastic, the elasticity is endogenous. Yet it remains very close to 
its BAU value in every case. 
22 = 2005 EU unitary direct emission * RoW unitary direct emission from Reinaud / EU unitary direct emission 
from Reinaud (2004). Submitted to EARE, 18 January 2008 
  24
consumption (MWh)
Source  Reinaud (2004) 
Yearly 
improvement in the 
EU (%) 
- -  0.9 0.4  - 
MACC  PRIMES PRIMES PRIMES
23 - 
10
-6 x (Production / Imports / Exports / Consumption ) 
EU 2005  3000/0/0/3000 187/20/21/186 211/15/8/218 2.9/3.9/0/6.8 
Row 2005  - 943/21/20/944  1729/8/15/1722 - 
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